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Belief about the Self

Name: Belief about the Self
Brand: Oxford University Press Inc
SKU: 04518190
Price: 43.79 EUR
Availability: InStock
Author: Neil Feit
ISBN: 9780195341362

A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Neil Feit

Lingua

Inglese

Libro Rigido

Codice Libristo: 04518190

Casa editrice Oxford University Press Inc, agosto 2008

Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are pr... Descrizione completa

Codice Libristo: 04518190

107 b

43.79 €

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Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self. These are beliefs that we express by means of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that in general, the contents of our beliefs are properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person. Belief about the Self offers a sustained defense of the Property Theory of Content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with an array of new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.